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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LUDWIG OSTERTAG, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DUNCAN G. LaMONT, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
DAVID LaMONT, a minor by Case No. 8983 
MARJORIE LaMONT, his Guardian 
Ad Litem 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LUDWIG OSTERTAG, 
Def,endant and Respondent, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
FACTS 
Counsel for Respondent feels the facts are not correctly 
stated by Appellants, and that an enlargement on said facts 
is in order. 
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On May 19, 1958, at about the hour of 9:30 P.M., 
Respondent Ludwig Ostertag was in his front yard at 1470 
South 3rd East, in Salt Lake City, watering his lawn. It was 
dark, hut Respondent noticed four boys proceeding South 
on third East on the West side of the street, on the same side 
as Respondent's home. Before the boys, one of whom was 
Appellant, David LaMont, reached Respondent's premises, 
they crossed over to the East side of the street, and when 
directly opposite Ludwig Ostertag, one or more of the boys 
(T-156, 158) threw rocks at Respondent, one of which hit 
him in the hack of the neck and the other at his feet (T-90). 
Now there had been a long series of abuses and attacks upon 
Respondent and his property by Appellant, David LaMont 
and other boys in company with David, (T-85, 86, 87, 88, 
89, 92, 148-28, 158-17, 206). Respondent, therefore put 
down his hose and walked after the boys, who had again 
crossed back to the West Side of the street after they had 
proceeded past the Ostertag home. Two of the boys began 
to run, but Respondent was able to approach David LaMont, 
and in broken English inquired why these boys wanted to 
make trouble. David LaMont conveniently says he doesn't 
remember anything that happened at that point (T-205), 
but the facts quite clearly point up that Mr. Ostertag made 
an attempt to reach out and apprehend the boy, (T-93, 154-5). 
but David LaMont, in trying to turn and run away, slipped 
and fell and then as he quickly got up to run again, he 
stumbled head first into a ditch where he scratched and cut 
his face (T-154-30, 155-8, 203-9). The LaMont boy and 
the others ran West on Kensington A venue and decided to 
go about a half mile out of their way to one of the other 
boy's homes, since David LaMont was fearful about going 
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into his own house because of the trouble he had been in 
before with the Ostertags, (T-155-20, 184). 
Later that same night, after the boys had spread the 
story among some of their parents that Respondent had 
brutally attacked and beaten David LaMont, the boys, 
together with one V eston Coleman, returned to the Ostertag 
premises, the police were called, and Appellant, Duncan 
LaMont, the father of David LaMont was summoned. When 
Duncan LaMont arrived in his car, he jumped out, ran onto 
Respondent's property, and without inquiring into the facts, 
assaulted and battered Respondent in a malicious and re-
vengeful manner, (T-99, 114, 209-6, 212-21). Respondent 
received a fractured rib, lacerations of the face, body bruises, 
loosened front teeth, a broken dental plate, and other con-
siderable pain and suffering, (T-99, 100, 159, 161). He 
also was prevented from working for a time, and suffered 
about $650.00 loss in wages as a result, ( T -102, 103). 
Respondent then brought an action against Appellant, 
Duncan LaMont, claiming general and exemplary damages. 
Subsequently, David LaMont brought action against Re-
spondent claiming general and exemplary damages. These 
two actions were later consolidated, although counsel for 
Respondent had opposed Appellant's motion for the con-
solidation, (T-12, 14). Judgment was found in favor of Re-
spondent and damages awarded, from which award appellants 
have taken this appeal. 
FIRST ACTION 
LUDWIG OSTERTAG vs. DUNCAN LaMONT 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AWARDED ARE NOT 
EXCESSIVE. 
2. THE VERDICT WAS NOT A RESULT OF PASSION 
AND PREJUDICE. 
3. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY WERE 
PROPER. 
SECOND ACTION 
DAVID LaMONT vs. LUDWIG OSTERTAG 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. DAVID LaMONT WAS NOT DENIED ANY RIGHT ON 
THE QUESTION OF MEDICAL EXPENSE. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AWARDED ARE NOT 
EXCESSIVE. 
Counsel for Appellants has tried to make a point of 
hearsay comments of a couple of jury members in arguing 
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that $860.00 exemplary damages is excessive. Counsel for 
Respondent submits that such argument is not proper nor 
is it material to this Appeal. There is much weighty evidence 
in this case for the jury to make a substantial award in ex-
emplary damages. Defendant Duncan LaMont's own testi-
mony at the trial showed his extremely revengeful and ma-
licious attitude in this terrible act. One apparent reason that 
the Jury chose to award greater exemplary damages rather 
than obviously deserved compensatory damages was the vin-
dictive attitude of Appellant in his testimony and the use 
of exemplary damages as a deterrent to such actions as in-
structed by the Court (T-61). Counsel's question to Duncan 
LaMont on cross examination was: "Mr. LaMont, did you 
go and strike Mr. Ostertag for revenge?" His answer came 
back quickly, angrily and vindictively, "/ sure did! I sure 
did!" (T-209-6). 
Contrary to Appellant's argument that the Court refused 
to allow defendant Duncan LaMont to show the jury that his 
child, David, had been punished because of his prior abuses 
toward Respondent, the testimony shows that David LaMont 
was definitely punished by his father for his previous acts, 
( T -202-l 0). Further, if there was any misconception of the 
facts, we submit that it was Appellant's own doing by in-
sisting that the two actions be consolidated and tried as one, 
and in view of the very apparent inconsistancies of Appel-
lant's own witnesses, the four boys, as they testified. 
The jury chose to believe, and rightly so from the evi-
dence, that Respondent had not brutally beaten David La-
Mont, as was claimed, and that there was not sufficient provo-
cation for the defendant, Duncan LaMont, to mercilessly beat 
up Respondent and thus be exempt from punitive damages. 
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It is true that the actual damages awarded by the jury 
were considerably less than the exemplary damage award. 
This does not mean, however, that there was not actually 
more damage in the compensatory class sustained by Re-
spondent. In fact, the evidence quite clearly points this out 
(T-99, 100, 159, 161). Consequently there is a reasonable 
relation between the actual and the exemplary damages. 
Counsel for Appellant has cited Evans v. Gaisford in 
support of his argument, but a study of that case will show 
it supports Respondent's position, and the quotation ren-
dered is not the Court's finding or conclusion at all. 
Our Supreme Court has set down no definite measure 
in this regard, but has pointed out a general rule or two 
which counsel feels fully justifies this Court now in affirm-
ing the trial Court. In Falkenberg vs. Neff, 269 P. 1008, 
the court, in upholding a punitive award of $1,500.00 where 
the actual damages were only $362.50 said: 
"There is no definite basis upon which the amount 
can be computed, but there must necessarily be a limit 
to the amount which may be awarded. It is the gen-
eral rule that the award should not be disproportion-
ate to the actual damage sustained, or should bear 
some relation to the injury complained of." 
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that there were more 
actual damages sustained than was awarded by the jury. 
In the case of Finney vs. Lockhart (Calif.) 217 P2nd 19, 
where $2,000.00 exemplary damages was not considered 
excessive and where only one dollar general damages was 
awarded, the court said: 
"That the verdict implied a finding that the plain-
tiff had sustained actual damages, and that the fact 
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that only nominal damages were awarded in the 
compensatory class did not necessarily imply a find-
ing that no more actual damages were sustained." 
We submit, therefore, that the jury's verdict of even 
·$2,000.00 exemplary damages in this case was not excessive 
under the circumstances, so especially in view of the trial 
court's reduction of said damages to $860.00, the award 
is not excessive. 
Further, we suggest that the amount of punitive dam-
ages should be left to the sound discretion of the jury and 
trial Court, as further point~d out in the Neff case above 
~ited, and in 35 ALR 2nd 310, Section 2. 
See also, in support of Respondent's position the follow-
ing cases: Evans vs. Gaisford, 247 P2nd 431; Calkins vs. 
Engle, 300 S.W. 997 (cited in the Gaisford case); Thompson 
vs. Aldrich, et al, 297 P2nd 226. 
Point II 
THE VERDICT WAS NOT A RESULT OF PASSION 
AND PREJUHICE. 
Counsel for Appellants argues that Respondent paraded 
before the jury that life had been made intolerable for him 
and his family by Appellant, David LaMont, and other boys. 
Counsel is hardly in a position to have insisted on the two 
actions being tried together, knowing that Ludwig Ostertag 
would have to defend by showing the abuses against him 
by David LaMont and other boys in company and consort 
with him, and then, because the jury found in favor of 
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Respondent, claim there was passion and prejudice by rea-
son of the actions of the very boy who had sued Ostertag. 
Further, counsel for Appellants, in his own cross ex-
amination of Ludwig Ostertag brought out the fact that 
Ostertags had lost everything, and had no money, and found 
it necessary to return back to Germany to be free from their 
troubles here, ( T -110-7) . 
A careful examination of the transcript involving Mr. 
Ostertag's testimony will disclose a difficult time was had 
because of the language barrier, and Mr. Ostertag's inability 
to understand and speak the English language, and even 
though an interpreter was found to be necessary by the Court, 
every phrase and word, which would normally not be a prob-
lem, could present some difficulty in the translation and 
communication. Yet, it is pointed out, that even though 
the word "they" was sometimes used in the translation, it 
was quite clear that David LaMont was involved in each of 
the disrespectful and delinquent acts testified to, although he 
never seemed to do these things alone. This however, had 
nothing to do with the jury's determination of the issues 
against Duncan LaMont, but only as it affected the boy, 
David LaMont's, case and his right to punitive damages. 
We submit, therefore, that the jury duly deliberated in 
this matter and was not moved upon by passion and prejudice, 
but properly, in accordance with the Court's instructions 
(T-48) and because of the extremely malicious and revenge-
ful act and attitude of defendant, Duncan LaMont, awarded 
exemplary damages against him. 
Point III 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
WERE PROPER. 
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Respondent will argue Appellant's Points III, IV, and V 
in one point. 
The question of punitive damages and how it should 
be treated by the jury in connection with both plaintiffs 
in this trial was clearly and adequately expressed to the jury 
by the trial court's instruction 9 through 12 (T-47, 48, 49). 
The Court said in instruction 9, {T-47): 
"Such acts as you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence to have been committed may be considered 
in determining whether or not punitive damages 
should be awarded, and, if so, the amount thereof." 
Again in instruction l 0 ( T -48) the Court said: 
"However, the jury is not obligated to award puni-
tive damages in any case, and they should be awarded 
only if you feel that an award of actual damages 
sustained by Mr. Ostertag against Mr. LaMont is 
not a sufficient deterrent to prevent a repetition of 
such an assault or is not a sufficient warning to other 
people who might be tempted to do the same thing. 
In no event can punitive damages be awarded unless 
the act was done in a wanton, reckless, or vicious and 
uncalled for manner." 
We submit, therefore, that defendant's requested in-
struction numbers 4, 5, and 6, were given in substance, and 
that to have given the instructions verbatim as counsel argues 
should have been done, would have been improper. Respond-
ent at no time admitted injuring David LaMont ( T -93-9), 
and the evidence shows rather conclusively that any injuries 
received by David LaMont were from his fall in the gutter 
face down (T-203-9), and from his own doing. It was 
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also very dark when Duncan LaMont came upon the property 
of the Ostertags and, without any hesitation at all, he com-
menced his attack upon Respondent, (T-114-11, 98-29). 
In defendant's requested instruction number 4 (T-36), 
he states: 
" ... while such is not justification for an attack upon 
the plaintiff Ludwig Ostertag, you may, nevertheless, 
consider such as provocation in the mitigation of any 
damages, if any, that were sustained by the plaintiff, 
Ludwig Ostertag ... " 
In 4 American Jurisprudence, Page 204, Section 165, 
it states: 
"The better rule and weight of authority, however, 
are in favor of the proposition that actual or compen-
satory damages are not subject to mitigation by proof 
of mere provocation or malice." 
Again in Section 166 of the same citation: 
"If the assault is made after time for reflection and 
under circumstances leading to the presumption that 
it was for revenge, the assailant stands in the position 
of an original trespasser, and the conduct of the other 
party will not serve as an extenuation or in mitigation 
of damages." 
The evidence is conclusive that Duncan LaMont acted 
for revenge (T-209-6). The Court, therefore, did properly 
instruct the jury in this matter, and even had defendant re-
quested an instruction on mitigation of punitive damages, 
which he did not, the Court's instructions to the jury would 
still have been proper under the circumstances. 
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SECOND ACTION 
DAVID LaMONT vs. LUDWIG OSTERTAG 
DAVID LaMONT WAS NOT DENIED ANY RIGHT 
ON THE QUESTION OF MEDICAL EXPENSE. 
The introduction in evidence of the medical expenses of 
David LaMont were received, without objection, from counsel 
for Respondent and duly considered by the jury, (T-208). 
The jury was also properly instructed as to damages as shown 
in the Court's instruction number 12. Appellant's contention 
that the Court instructed the jury that they could not con-
sider this an element of damages is not supported by the 
record and is untrue. 
The fact that although the jury found that a battery had 
been committed by Ostertag in the touching of David LaMont, 
but awarded no damages for said battery, would indicate 
that the jury felt the boy's injuries were not the proximate 
result of said battery, therefore, no damages or medical 
expenses would be awarded. Moreover, it is Respondent's 
contention that there has been no violation nor infringement 
of Appellant's rights in this matter that could justify a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Certainly it is a black mark on this community and 
America when such a family as Ostertags must find it neces-
sary to return back to their homeland, Germany, to free 
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themselves of such experiences of persecution in this free 
land, and while we do not wish to imply that the Court 
should not consider every facet in this case as to justice 
and fairness, we do wish to comment that justice ends with 
this Court on this Appeal as far as Respondent is concerned. 
Surely, therefore, from a careful analysis of this case, 
this Honorable Court will find that the parties hereto have 
. had their day in court, and we strongly urge that every 
consideration should be given to upholding the trial Court 
and jury in their deliberations and judgment in this cause, 
and thus rectify, at least in some measure, the terrible wrong 
done to Respondent and his family. 
Counsel for Respondent respectfully requests this Court 
to affirm the decision of the trial Court with costs to 
Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHILD, SPAFFORD & YOUNG 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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